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PRICE MAINTENANCE IN THE DISTRIBUTION
OF NEW SECURITIES
As the result of a series of inquiries which reached a crescendo in the
Pecora Investigation of 1933,1 the investment banking industry has become
one of the most closely regulated segments of our economic system. The
Securities Exchange Commission, administering the Securities Act of 1933,2
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 I and subsequent legislation,4 is in close
touch with all phases of the industry, and an investigating team from the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is now bringing witnesses
before an investigatory grand jury in New York r-the penultimate step in
an investigation of the industry which has been under way for several years,
and which may culminate in a prosecution under the Sherman Act.0
The attention of investigators has invariably been caught by the huge
figures with which investment bankers deal-flotations amounting to less
than five million dollars are referred to in the trade as "small issues"--, and
inquiries have centered on the concentration of power made possible by the
funneling of these impressive sums through a relatively small number of
large banking houses. Of the three phases of the issuing process-origina-
tion, underwriting and distribution 8-, the first has been thought to contain
the most dangerous potentialities for monopolistic control, and thousands of
pages of testimony have been taken with a view to the diagnosis, treatment
and cure of unhealthy relationships between the investment banker and in-
1. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. Res. 84, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932) and S. Res. 56 and 97, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); SE,;. REP No. 1455, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The first full-scale investigation of the industry xas undertaken in
New York State in 1909 [REPORT OF Gov. HUGHES' COMMITrEE ON SPEcLATION Ln SE-
cuRITEs AND COmmODITIES (1909)], and led to the Pujo Investigation of 1913 (Committee on
Banking and Currency-Money Trust Investigation under H. Res. 429 and 504, 62d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1913)]. See also 10 TNEC VERBATnI RECORD (1939-40) passim.
2. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77a (1940).
3. 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78a (1940).
4. The Securities Exchange Act was amended in 1936 [49 STAT. 1375 (1936), 15 U.S. C.
§ 78 hh-1 (1940)], and again in 1938 by the Maloney Amendment [52 STAT. 1070 (1938),
15 U. S. C. § 78 0-3 (1940)]. Other laws which have increased the SEC's jurisdiction over
the industry are the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 [49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15
U. S. C. § 79 (1940)]; the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 [53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U. S. C.
§ 77aaa (1940)]; the Investment Company Act of 1940 [54 STA*T. 789, 15 U. S. C. § 80 a-1
(1940)]; and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [54 STAT. 847, 15 U. S. C. § 80 b-1 (1940)].
5. N. Y. Journal American, Oct. 23, 1946, p. 24, col. 1. See aLo Gould in the N. Y.
Journal American, Oct. 24,1946, p. 22, col. 3.
6. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1940).
7. Supra note 1; see also BRAlEIS, OT=ER PEOPLE'S MONEY (2d ed. 1932) 28 el seq.;
DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE (1940) c. 3 passim.
8. ATKINS, EDWARDS AND IMoULToN, THE REGULATION OF THE SECuRuTY M ArT~s
(1946) 31. The authors describe the origination function as including "discovery, investiga-
tion and negotiation."
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
dustry.9 Regulatory requirements such a's arm's length bargaining 10 and
competitive bidding "1 have been aimed particularly at the origination phase,
while underwriting and distribution have been affected less directly.
Recently, however, the distribution phase has been competing with the
banker-issuer relationship for the investigatorial spotlight. Price mainte-
nance, an integral part of the mechanism for widespread distribution of new
securities, has come under fire from the Trading and Exchange Division of
the SEC 12 and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and has
been stoutly defended by representatives of the bankers.' Bills have been
introduced in Congress which seek specifically to exempt price maintenance
in securities from the operation of the antitrust laws, 14 while simultaneously
attempts have been made to demonstrate that such "pegging" is both eco-
nomically unjustified and a direct violation of the Sherman Act.16 In Matter
of National Association of Securities Dealers,0 a recent decision by the SEC,
the issues are clearly drawn; a detailed consideration of the case will provide
a picture of the mechanism of security flotation, while pointing up the argu-
ments for and against price maintenance which are to.be analyzed more
fully, below.
The N.A.S.D., a quasi-governmental organization set up in accordance
with the terms of an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act,1 7 regulates
many activities in the investment banking industry which Congress, with
the advice of the SEC, de~ided could best be controlled through a body
composed of representatives of the industry.'" Its Rules of Fair Practice,
9. Supra, note 1. See also Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on
S. 3895, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934): More than 12,000 pages
of record were compiled during the Pecora Investigation alone; SEN. REP. No. 1455, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 3.
10. SEC Rule U-12F-2, Holding Company Act of 1935, SEC Release No. 1380 (1938).
For a discussion of the application of this rule, see Clark, J., in Morgan Stanley & Co. v.
SEC, 126 F. (2d) 325, 327-30 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942). Both this rule and that requiring competi-
tive bidding apply only to public utility securities within the scope of the Holding Company
Act.
11. SEC Rule U-50, Holding Company Act of 1935, SEC Release No. 2676 (1941).
See Comment (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1071.
12. The Trading and Exchange Division of the SEC will be referred to infra a the
Staff.
13. Matter of National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Sec. Exch. Act of 1934,
SEC Release No. 3700 (1945).
14. Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 4344, H. R.
5065, and H. R. 5832, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942); H. R. 1626, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945)
(introduced by Rep. Reece).
15. Briefs and Proposed Findings of Fact for Department of Justice and SEC Trading
and Exchange Division, Matter of National Association of Securities Dealers, Sec. Exch.
Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 3700 (1945).
16. Sec. Exch. Act, SEC Release No. 3700 (1945).
17. The Maloney Amendment, 52 STAT. 1070 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 78 0-3 (1940).
18. The N.A.S.D. membership includes approximately 90 per cent of all eligible secur-
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based on the short-lived N.R.A. Code for Investment Bankers,9 are en-
forced by District Business Conduct Committees, with review by the
N.A.S.D. Board of Governors, the SEC, and finally the Federal Courts.-3-
The instant case came before the SEC as a review of disciplinary proceed-
ings taken by the N.A.S.D. against certain of its members in connection
with an issue of bonds by the Public Service Company of Indiana.
HIsToRY OF TEM P.S.I. IssuE
Desiring to refund outstanding bonds at a lower interest rate, P.S.I.
entered into negotiations 21 during the summer of 1939 with the investment
banking firm of Halsey, Stuart & Co., which resulted in an Underwriting
Agreement providing for the purchase 22 by the underwriters of bonds in the
principal amount of $38,000,000, authority for the issue having been ob-
tained from the SEC 23 and the Public Service Commission of Indiana.2
The public offering price was set at 102, the underwriters agreeing to pay
P.S.I. 100 for the bonds.
The two-point difference, known as the "spread," was divided as follows:
manager's fee, Y point; underwriting commission, 3f point; selling conces-
ity dealers. A strong incentive to membership is supplied by provisions which prohibit
members from granting selling group concessions to non-members. The efforts of the Aczo-
ciation have been directed largely toward standardization of practices in the over-the-
counter market, although many N.A.S.D. members are also members of exchanges. Se
Grant, The N.A.S.D.: Its Origin and Operation [1942] Wis. L. REv. 597.
19. INVESTMEN'r BANKERS CODE COMMNITEE, CODE OF FAIR COsPETIrON For IN-
VESTMiENT BANKERS (1934).
20. Sanctions authorized under the Maloney Amendment include fines, suspension and
expulsion from membership in the Association. Since many dealers depend to a large ex-
tent on selling group concessions for their business, and such concessions are not allowed to
non-members (supra note 17), expulsion from membership in the Association can amount
to expulsion from the industry.
21. SEC Rule U-50, requiring competitive bidding in the sale of securities by holding
companies and their subsidiaries, had not been adopted at that time. See Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935, SEC Release No. 2676 (1941). Issues sold under that rule are, however,
distributed under agreements such as those which governed the P.S.I. distribution.
22. The Underwriting Agreement contained an "out" clause, whereby upon the hap-
pening of certain contingencies the underwriters could terminate the contract. While theze
clauses have been criticized as a refusal on the part of underwriters to make a "firm commit-
ment" to the issuer (ATxNs, EDwAxRDS AND' MOULTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 40) in prac-
tice they have rarely been invoked.
23. Matter of Public Service Co. of Indiana, 6 SEC 286 (1939), a decision granting an
exemption from Section 6(a) of the Holding Company Act, which prohibits the issuance of
securities of a Public Utility Holding company or subsidiary until declarations have been
filed and approved by the SEC. The exemption was granted, under Section 6(b) of the Act,
because funds were to be used solely to finance the business of a subsidiary (P.S.!. is a sub-
sidiary of the Trustees of Midland United Company), and because the issue had bzen
authorized by the state commission.
24. Public Service Commission of Indiana, Case No. 13,947, cited in Matter of Public
Service Co. of Indiana, 6 SEC 286, 294 (1939).
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sion to members of the selling group, one point. Underwriters and selling
group members were permitted to allow a concession of 4 point from the
public offering price to N.A.S.D. members not included in either group.
During the negotiations with P.S.I., Halsey Stuart formed a group of 67
underwriters who agreed to purchase the issue from P.S.I., delivery of the
bonds and payment to take place seven days after the public offering. The
registration statement filed with the SEC became effective on December 7,
1939, on which date the bonds were offered for sale to the public. The dis-
tribution group, all of whom were members of the N.A.S.D., included the 67
underwriters, who retained for sale to their customers approximately two-
thirds of the issue, and a selling group of 396 dealers, to whom was allotted
the remainder.
2 5
In addition to the registration statement, prospectus and Underwriting
Agreement, the process of issuing involved two agreements which contained
specific undertakings not to sell below the public offering price until the
Manager should elect to change the price or remove price restrictions. These
were the Agreement between Underwriters, and the Selling Agreement. 0
The Agreement between Underwriters gave the Manager the right to
stabilize,27 through the purchase and sale of P.S.I. bonds 25 for each under-
writer's account, until the termination of the Selling Agreement. The Agree-
ment between Underwriters also contained a repurchase penalty clause,
25. Only 60 per cent of the bonds allotted to the selling group were taken on the issuing
date, and not until almost three months later was the entire allotment taken by dealers
(supra, note 13, at 59). Despite the desire of dealers to remain on the preferred list of promi-
nent underwriters, they do occasionally, as in this instance, decline an allotment. For ex-
.amples of attempts by dealers to remain in underwriters' good graces even after such a
refusal, see 10 TNEC VERBATit REcoRD (1939-40) 631-2.
26. The Agreement between Underwriters was in the form of a letter addressed to and
confirmed by Halsey Stuart, a copy of which was signed by each underwriter. The letter
provided that the copies should.constitute one agreement among all the underwriters. The
Selling Agreement, also in letter form, contained an acceptance blank which was filled in by
those dealers who agreed to become members of the selling group. Supra note 13, at 5-6,
57-8.
27. Stabilization by the Manager in this, as in most issues, was conducted by making
an offer to buy any of the new P.S.I. bonds at the public offering price. The purpose of such
pegging activity is to prevent the over-the-counter price of the issue from dropping below
the offering price during the distribution period. In slow issues, the Manager may peg the
open market price somewhat below the offering price; in the P.S.I. issue the Manager's open
market bid of'102 was reduced to 101 after the first month of the offering.
As is usually the rule, the Agreement between Underwriters stipulated that the Mana-
ger should not, at any time, buy or sell for long or short account in excess of ten per cent of
the total issue. The P.S.I. issue differed from most, however, in that the agreements pro-
vided that in addition to the Manager's open market activities, the other underwriters and
selling group members might make purchases and sales in the open market for their own ac-
counts. Id. at 6.
28. Provision is often made for stabilization of any outstanding securities of the issuer




which provided that if the Manager, during stabilization, purchased a bond
at or below the public offering price, he could require the undervwiter to
whom the bond was traced either to repurchase the bond, or to forfeit an
amount equal to the selling concession plus any broker's commission.? The
Selling Agreement imposed a similar sanction on members of the selling
group as to forfeiture of selling concession, but omitted the requirement as
to repurchase.3
The issue was offered to the public during a period of uncertainty in the
bond market, partially attributable to the commencement of hostilities in
Europe. Sales were very slow, and the Selling Agreement was continued in
effect for 103 days,3 the Agreement between Undenriters being terminated
two days later. Despite extensive stabilization activities, the bonds were
quoted as low as 100 bid, and during the distribution period 1171 bonds
were sold below the public offering price; 338 bonds by the underwriters and
833 by members of the selling group. 32
This price cutting gave rise to numerous complaints to the N.A.S.D. Dis-
trict Committees from underwriters and selling group members who had
"held the line." The complaints alleged that those who cut prices in contra-
vention of their contractual agreement were violating a provision of the
N.A.S.D. Rules, which requires of N.A.S.D. members "high standards of
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade." 3 The Dis-
trict Committees fined 70 of the 107 firms charged with violations and dis-
missed the remaining complaints, but the Board of Governors reversed the
cases in which complaints had been dismissed, imposing fines in every in-
stance. The SEC instituted review proceedings in 1941 as to six cases typify-
ing the various fact situations, and a Trial Examiner held hearings in 1942.
Oral argument before the Commissioners was delayed until 1944, and at that
29. The purpose of the repurchase provision is two-fold: (1) it encourages placement of
the security for investment, by penalizing dealers for sales to "free riders," who buy only for
speculation, and if the market price does not advance, unload their purchase during the
period of the distribution; (2) it operates as a deterrent to price-cutting, since the dealer
stands to lose his entire commission, when the security sold at or below the issuing price
comes back on the market and is purchased by the Manager. If the Manager is offering to
buy at the issuing price, it is very likely that securities which dealers have sold below that
price will come into the open market. Individual bonds are traced to the dealer or under-
writer to be penalized through the serial numbers on the bonds.
30. The Selling Agreement was to run for 60 days, but was terminable at any time by
the Manager, who also had the privilege of extending for another 60 days. The Agreement
between Underwriters was to terminate 30 days after the Selling Agreement, but could be
terminated by the Manager at any time after the date of settlement vith P.S.I.
31. The P.S.I. distribution was one of the longest in recent years, the average time of
distribution for similar issues being eleven or twelve days. Supra note 13, at 7.
32. Id. at 8-9.
33. N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 1. These Rules together with the By-
laws of the N.A.S.D. were found by the SEC to comply with the requirements of the Ia-
loney Amendment, in an order granting the N.A.S.D.'s application for registration. Matter
of Application by N.A.S.D., 5 SEC 627 (1939).
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time the Department of Justice, over objections by the N.A.S.D., was per-
mitted to intervene.
34
The SEC handed down an 'order in June, 1945, setting aside the discipli-
nary action of the N.A.S.D. in all the cases reviewed." The majority held
that the N.A.S.D. had no authority to discipline its members for violating
price maintenance agreements, since the N.A.S.D.'s interpretation of its
rules conflicted with Section 15A (b)(7) of the Securities Exchange Act,
which requires that a securities association's rules be designed to remove
impediments to a free market, and prohibits rules designed to impose sched-
ules of prices." The Commission found that price maintenance agreements
were impediments to a free market and that the N.A.S.D.'s action tended to
increase, not remove, such impediments. Further, the Commission held
that the enforcement of such agreements by the N.A.S.D. amounted to the
imposition of schedules of discounts on the Association's members.
While the interpretation of the Act was decisive, another issue, raised by
the briefs and oral arguments of the SEC's Staff and the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice, received extensive treatment in the opinions
written by the Commission, as well as the lion's share of the publicity which
the case attracted.37 This issue was the legality of any price maintenance
agreement under the antitrust laws. The Staff, agreeing with the Antitrust
Division that the Commission had no power to enforce the Sherman Act
directly, contended that the agreements must be considered "within the
frame of reference" of the antitrust laws. 38 So considered, it was argued,
34. The motion of the N.A.S.D. to strike the appearance of the Department was
denied, Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 3544 (1944).
35. Supra note 13.
36. 52 STAT. 1070 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 78 0-3 (1940): "(b) An applicant association
shall not be registered as a national securities association unless it appears to the Commis-
sion that . ..(7) the rules of the association are designed to prevent fraudulent and manip-
ulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to provide safe-
guards against unreasonable profits or unreasonable rates of commission or other charges,
and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest, and to remove impediments to
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market; and are not designed to permit unfair
discrimination between customers or issuers, or brokers or dealers, to fix minimum profits,
to impose any schedule of prices, or to impose any schedule or fix minimum rates of commis-
sions, allowances, discounts, or other charges; . .
37. The importance which the antitrust aspect of the case assumed in the eyes of in-
vestment bankers is evident from the statement of Colonel Pope, President of the First
Boston Corporation, that if the Attorney General should act to enforce his opinion, as ex-
pressed in the Antitrust Division brief, post-war expansion and reconversion of industry
"will largely cease, unless the Government undertakes to do the financing . H." carings
before Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning, Pursuant to 11. Res.
408, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) 444.
38. The Antitrust Division, in its brief, quoted extensively from McLean Trucking
Company, Inc. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67 (1944) as authority for its argument that the
SEC must consider the Sherman Act as "a touchstone for the legal qualities and character-
istics of the Association rules." Brief of the Dep't of Justice, 13-6. The majority in the
McLean case, affirming an order of the ICC approving the consolidation of several truck
[Vol. 56:.333
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price maintenance agreements were illegal per se, and anyone cutting prices
would, by refusing to abide by the terms of an illegal contract, be acting
honorably, and therefore could not be disciplined under the N.A.S.D.'s rules.
Although the majority of the SEC found that it was unnecessary to con-
sider the question, 20 of the 46 pages in their opinion were devoted to a dis-
cussion of the applicability of the antitrust lav'ns to price maintenance agree-
ments. Commissioner McConnaughey, in his concurring opinion, indicated
that the "gratuitous comment" of the majority would afford doubtful legal
precedent should th! issue later be presented directly. Commissioner
Healy, dissenting as to the application of the Securities Act, found that the
decision of the case required a consideration of the antitrust argument, and
determined that the contracts involved did not violate either the letter or
the spirit of the antitrust laws.40
Both the majority and dissenting opinions of the SEC concluded not only
that the agreements in the P.S.I. issue were lawful, but, more generally, that
price maintenance agreements in securities distribution were not per se in
violation of the Sherman Act. While the worries of the investment bankers
were thus partially allayed,41 the Commission pointed out by way of caveat
that under certain circumstances a particular underwriting agreement might
be an unlawful suppression of competition. 42 The ubiquitous presence of the
lines, under the National Transportation Act of 1940, pointed out that the ICC had no
power to enforce the Sherman Act as such, but only the Interstate Commerce Act and other
legislation dealing specifically with transportation problems. The court continued: "That
legislation constitutes the immediate frame of reference within which the Commisrion
operates and the policies expressed in it must be the basic determinants of its actions.
"But in executing these policies the Commission may be faced with overlapping and at
times inconsistent policies embodied in other legislation enacted at different times and with
different problems in view. When this is true, it cannot, without more, ignore the latter.
The precise adjustments which it must make, however, will vary from instance to instance
depending on the extent to which Congress indicates a desire to have those policies leavened
or implemented in the enforcement of the various specific provisions of the legislation vith
which the Commission is primarily and directly concerned." 321 U. S. at 79, 80.
39. Supra note 13 at 47, 52 n. 6.
40. Id. at 55, 72-4.
41. Halsey Stuart had, for a period of more than a year prior to the SEC's decision,
omitted price maintenance agreements, repurchase penalty and stabilization provisions from
distributions which it managed. (See reference, not mentioning firm's name, in Comm'r
Healy's opinion, supra note 13 at 55 n. 1.) Difficulties were encountered on several "sticky"
issues, however, where price cutting by underwriters occurred shortly after the offering date.
Halsey Stuart returned to the use of price maintenance provisions after the NA.S.D. deci-
sion was announced.
42. Factors which the majority found to be important in determining the validity or
invalidity of a given distribution were: (1) the size of the distribution groups in relation to
the size of the issue; (2) the powers reserved by the Manager; (3) the duration of the distribu-
tion; (4) the type and quality of the security; (5) the size and nature of the class of investors
to whom the distribution must be made; (6) the extent to which the price of the issue affects
other issues "or is permitted, by artificial means, to exceed the competitive limits set by
free market forces affecting similar types of securities." Id. at 39. Commissioner Healy,
1947]
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Antitrust Division investigating team, which has been going through the
records of the larger underwriting houses for the past year, and is now haling
officers and partners of these houses before a federal grand jury, has done
nothing to put those worries to rest.
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
The briefs of the SEC Staff and N.A.S.D. and the opinions of the Com-
missioners, in their discussion of the antitrust issue, emphasized the question
of the economic desirability of price maintenance. With that question and
the corollary problem as to what, if anything, should be substituted if price
maintenance were eliminated, this study is chiefly concerned. However,
from the point of view of the Antitrust Division, such discussion is unnec-
essary, for the Division found the law to be clear as to the illegality of price
maintenance agreements. Since, as Commissioner McConnaughey pointed
out,43 the SEC's comments on the antitrust issue in the instant case could be
disregarded as dicta in any later litigation, the Division's arguments merit
consideration as indicative of the approach which may be followed by the
Division in the antitrust suit for which the current Grand Jury investigation
is the groundwork. The Commission's comments are also pertinent as indi-
cating the reaction of an administrative tribunal, which may well serve as
a guide for a court considering similar issues.
The Division stressed that price-fixing agreements were per se in violation
of the Sherman Act, citing the rule established in the Trenton Polleries 44 and
Socony- Vacluum 45 cases. Taken at face value, the phraseology of the Su-
preme Court, particularly in the latter case, precludes any argument as to
the reasonableness or desirability of a particular price-fixing agreement. 4
To the extent that this conclusive presumption of illegality can be con-
sidered a doctrine of general application, therefore, the Division's arguments
are very persuasive.
47
while not troubling to outline any criteria, had "little doubt that underwriters may combine
in such numbers and under such circumstances as to violate the Sherman Act," Id. at 73.
43. Id. at 52, n. 6.
44. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392, 397-8 (1927).
45. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940).
46. "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect
of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or
foreign commerce is illegal per se." Id. at 223.
47. But see Commissioner Healy's demurrer: "... I accept the principle that price-
fixing is illegal per se and that in price-fixing cases no question of reasonableness is involved.
- * ' For men [engaged in a common undertaking] to agree to observe a public offering price
and not to cut that offering price during a reasonable period of initial distribution does not
appear to me to be price-fixing or resale price maintenance as those terms are used in the
cases under the Sherman Act and the acts supplementing it. Typical price-fixing agreements
occur when producers or wholesalers or others normally in competition with each other fix
uniform prices or agree not to compete as to price. Here, while there are hundreds of mil-
lions of other bonds of roughly similar quality outstanding and being freely traded (except
[Vol. 56: 33
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The N.A.S.D. brief, while assuming a bewildering number of alternative
positions,48 relied chiefly on the "rule of reason" and the Appalacdan
Coals -' case. Cases adopting the Trenton Potteries doctrine were distin-
guished on the ground that the agreements held illegal concerned the f.rng
of market prices, whereas price maintenance in the flotation of new securities
has no effect on the general market, but performs a useful function in the
process of distribution of the new issue.
The SEC majority, admitting the weakening of the "rule of reason," 51
emphasized the Congressional policy of recognition of fixed-price distribu-
tion,52 and pointed out that Congress had refused to outlaw stabilization,
but had delegated to the Commission authority to regulate the practice.Y3
when stabilized), a group of underwriters combined their capital and efforts in a syndicate
to provide P.S.I. with what money it needed and distributed its bonds to the public ...
Having combined, it was proper for each quasi-partner to agree not to cut his other partners'
throats." Supra note 13, at 73-4.
48. Some of these alternatives were: (1) The Commission had no jurisdiction to decide
the question of illegality under the Sherman Act; (2) even if the Commission had jurisdic-
tion the distributing organization was a joint adventure, similar to an integrated combina-
tion, and therefore there was no unreasonable restraint of trade or violation of the Sherman
Act; (3) if the distributing organization was not a joint adventure but a loose-knit combina-
tion, there was no violation of the Sherman Act because the rule of the Appalachian Coals
case (infra note 50) applied; (4) conceding arguendo that the distribution was neither a joint
adventure nor a loose-knit combination, there was no invalid resale price maintenance agree-
ment; (5) if there was a resale price maintenance agreement otherwise invalid under the
Sherman Act, such agreement was nevertheless valid under the Miller-Tydings Amendment
to that Act [50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1940)]. Brief for N.A.S.D. passim, Matter
of N.A.S.D., supra note 13.
49. "But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by Eo simple
a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regula-
tion of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality
is whether restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes com-
petition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Brandeis, J.,
in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918).
50. 288 U. S. 344 (1933). The Court, holding that a selling agency, although it had a
tendency to stabilize prices, did not set market prices and was not an illegal restraint of
trade, found that ". . . a close and objective scrutiny of particular conditions and purpozes
is necessary in each caie. Realities must dominate the judgment. The mere fact that the
parties to an agreement eliminate competition between themselves is not enough to condemn
it. ... The question of the application of the statute [the Sherman Act] is one of intent
and effect, and is not to be determined by arbitrary assumptions. . . ." Id. at 360-1.
51. Supra note 13, at 31. See Jaffe and Tobriner, The Legality of Price Fixing Agree-
ments (1932) 45 HARV. L. REv. 1164, 1181 for a discussion of the relative merits of the "rule
of reason" and that as to the per se illegality of price agreements.
52. The Commission pointed out that the registration statement required under the
Securities Act of 1933 must contain information as to the proposed public offering price,
and as to fixed commissions which are to be allowed. Supra note 13, at 40.
33. The specific delegation of authority to regulate stabilization applies only as to Ee-
curities registered on national securities exchanges; see section 9 (a)(6) of the Securities Ex-
change Act. The Commission has, however, required the filing of full information as to
stabilization operations in connection with any issue covered by a registration statement
1947]
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In the light of these indications of Congressional intent, the majority con-
cluded that decisions dealing with price-fixing and price-maintenance in
other commodities under the Sherman Act must "obviously be read with
caution." 54
THE PRESENT METHOD OF SECURITY DISTRIBUTION
In discussing present methods and possible changes in investment bank-
ing, two objeotives should be kept in mind: the protection of investors and
the maintenance of a smooth and continuous flow of capital into industry.
It should also be noted that, as illustrated in the P.S.I. issue, three steps are
involved in present price maintenance practices: the pricing of the issue;
agreements not to cut price, with their accompanying sanctions; and stabili-
zation. Defenders of the status quo maintain that a successful distribution
of a new issue depends on the existence of all three steps, while advocates of
change argue that the last tvo create an artificial market price and should
be eliminated.
The pricing function demands expert knowledge on the part of the invest-
ment banker, and is vital not only to him but to the issuer and investor. In
deciding on the public offering price and the spread,5" the banker must con-
sider a large number of variables, among which are the price on the market
of other similar securities, difficulties likely to be encountered in distribu-
tion, and anticipated market trends." If the removal of price maintenance
under the Securities Act. The intention to stabilize must be disclosed in the registration
statement and prospectus required by that Act. In its opinion in the instant case, the major-
ity argued that the power to define "manipulative" practices in over-the-counter transac-
tions, granted under Section 15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act, could include regulations
of stabilization as broad as any which might be adopted under Section 9 (a)(6). The state-
ment that stabilization operations, particularly in relation to new issues were not forbidden
altogether, but "subjected to such control as the administrative commission may find neces-
sary in the public interest or for the protection of investors," occurring in the House Report
on the Securities Exchange Bill of 1934 [H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)
10], was cited as indicative of Congressional intent to remove the entire stabilization prob-
lem from the scope of the Sherman Act. Id. at 41-43.
54. Id. at 43.
55. The decision, it should be noted, is not made ex parle, but in a bargaining process
between the Manager and the issuer. As will be pointed out infra, this trading is not neces-
sarily weighted on the side of the banker, for the issuer has alternative sources of capital
funds available to him should he be dissatisfied with the price suggested by the banker. For
example, see the description of "shopping around" by the Shell Union Oil Corporation in
10 TNEC VERBATim REcoRD (1939-40) 610-20, where (at 619), in discussing "the tremen-
dous trading proclivities of the [Shell] management" one banker announced himself as
"determined to avoid being crowded up by the company with regard to the terms of the
set-up and the price."
56. Other factors to be considered are (1) the conditions and prospects of the issuer's
business; (2) the investment rating of the proposed new issue, which determines the availa-
bility of the issue for purchase by banks, trust funds and insurance companies; (3) the pur-
pose for which the proceeds of the issue are to be used. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law Requested by N.A.S.D., 39-40, and those requested by the Staff, 25 et s q., Matter
of N.A.S.D., supra note 13.
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agreements and stabilization should so affect these variables as to lead to
increased spreads and lower public offering prices, the cost of new capital
might be considerably greater, and in some cases prohibitive for the issuer.
To what extent does price maintenance actually aid in the distribution of
new securities? Investment bankers argue that until a security becomes
known to the investing public and has been fairly widely distributed, there
can be no market which can give any reliable indication of the value of the
security. For example, in an issue as large as that of P.S.I., an investor
purchasing a single bond at the public offering price, who suddenly needed
cash, might, absent price maintenance, be unable to find an immediate
buyer except at a price considerably below the offering price. The offering
of a few bonds at this lower price could lower the over-the-counter price for
the whole issue, and would dissuade other prospective purchasers from
buying at the public offering priceA
7
Against this position, it is urged that since a variation of a point or less in
the offering price can make the difference between a slow, sticky issue and
an immediate, out-the-window distribution, a small reduction in offering
price would assure a speedy distribution without reliance on price mainte-
nance. The SEC Staff supported this argument with statistics based on
issues sold under the present system, which "broke" the offering price
despite price maintenance, but rallied at four or five points below that
price.
58
These statistics offer no assurance that a slow distribution unsupported by
price maintenance would not result in much more substantial price drops."
Further, while admitting that without price maintenance there would be
some increase in cost to the issuer from lower offering prices, the Staff did
not consider the probability that spreads would rise to meet the increased
risks involved in issuance. The admission that even under boom market
conditions remoVal of price maintenance would result in some increase in the
cost of money to the issuer, indicates the danger of permanent elimination of
such restrictions. With the return to market conditions where demand for
new capital more nearly balances supply, the offering price necessary to as-
sure an out-the-window distribution would be much lower, with a propor-
tionately higher cost of capital to the issuer.
57. Dealers customarily sell their allotments of a new issue on a net basis at the public
offering price, since they receive a commission in the form of a discount from the under-
writers. A technical reason for the absence of demand at the public offering price for an
offering made in the open market by an individual therefore suggests itself. Prospective
purchasers would have to pay a dealer's commission when buying in the market, and could
save the amount of that commission by purchasing directly from a member of the selling
group. See Gourrich, Inrestrnent Banking Methods Prior To and Since the Scurities Act of
1933 (1937) 4 LAw AND CONTEIP. PROB. 44.
58. Staff Brief at 32, Matter of N.A.S.D., supra note 13.
59. The Staff's discussion fails to take into consideration the fact that in the cases con-
sidered, a large portion of each issue had been distributed at the public offering price before
the distribution was terminated and price maintenance agreements were cancelled.
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It is probable that removal of price maintenance from the distribution
mechanism would adversely affect the flow of capital to industry, by in-
creasing the cost to the issuer. But this in itself cannot justify the retention
of price maintenance devices, if it be shown that the harm done to investors
through the operation of the present mechanism is such as to overbalance
the advantages which the system may hold for the issuer and underwriter.
Statistics have been cited to prove that upon termination of selling agree-
ments with their accompanying price restrictions, new issues tend to sell
below the public offering price,60 from which it is argued that the fixed price
was artificial, and that investors buying at that price paid more than the
security was worth. However, other statistics which show securities in-
creasing in price after the close of the distribution period are also available.0 '
This apparent contradiction is explained by the self-evident fact that prices
in the securities market fluctuate widely and that new issuesmay go above
or below the offering price, depending upon the reception they meet, and as
the general market rises or falls. Conclusions as to the effect of price mainte-
nance in creating artificially high prices cannot be drawn from available
statistical studies.
The present distribution system, including stabilization and price mainte-
nance agreements, minimizes the risks carried by the underwriter during the
issuing process.62 By the same token, the cost of capital to the issuer is
reduced, for the spread which an underwriter can hope to obtain as the result
of his bargaining with the issuer is measured in great part by the extent of
the risks he must assume.
If the offering price is set too high, early investors may take a loss, but
the underwriter has a "sticky" issue on his hands, and both his reputation
and that of the issuer suffers.63 If an issue is priced too low, the issuer fails
60. Steiner and Lasdon, The Market Action of New Issues-A Test of Syndicate Price
Pegging (1934) 12 HARv. Bus. REv. 339. The authors, on the basis of a study covering the
period 1924-32, conclude that approximately 75 per cent of the issues studied "broke" from
the offering price, which they attribute largely to the removal of stabilization, though ad-
mitting that some of the depreciation may be due to declining markets. Strong objections
are voiced against "flagrant overpricing."
61. Lasdon, The Market Action of New Issues-A Survey of Investor Experience (1940)
151 Co3. AND FiN. CHRON. 1774. One of the co-authors of the article cited supra note 60,
upon further study covering 354 issues for the period 1924-37, concludes that only 8.2 per
cent of the issues were over-priced, and that in 85 per cent of the issues, investors could have
liquidated at a profit within a year after issue. See also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Requested by N.A.S.D. 41 (Matter of N.A.S.D., supra note 13) where the average
deviation from the public offering rpice at the end of each of the first six weeks after distribu-
tion was terminated ranged from plus Y4 to plus Y2 point for 84 utility issues studied in
1938-40.
62. As was actually the case in the P.S.I. issue, a break in the open market price after
distribution has commenced, but before completion of allotment to the selling group, may
make dealers very reluctant to enter the selling group. Stabilization and price maintenance
agreements reduce the likelihood of such a break, although the possibility cannot be com-
pletely eliminated.
63. For the amount of the actual financial loss to the underwriter on a "sticky" issue,
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to get his money's worth, and those who have bought only for speculation
get a "free ride." 64 The underwriter's reputation in the industry is largely
dependent on the number of correctly-priced and successful issues he has
managed.
Distribution of securities is essentially a merchandising proposition, and
the new stocks and bonds which a dealer offers his customers must be priced
to sell.65 There is no attraction inherent in new securities which makes them
more desirable than outstanding issues. Each new issue is weighed against
the market price of outstanding securities," and if investors find the issue
priced too high, underwriters and selling group members are faced with the
tying up of their capital in unsalable merchandise. Thus the investor,
though not personally present during pricing discussions between issuer and
underwriter, is far from the forgotten man which he is sometimes repre-
sented as being.
It would appear, therefore, to be to the advantage of all parties that an
issue be correctly priced.' Furthermore, the availability of price mainte-
nance techniques seems to offer certain advantages to issuer and underwtiter
in the distribution of an issue. But price maintenance imports no reciprocal
disadvantage for the investor; in fact, two possible advantages suggest
themselves. First, a purchaser of P.S.I. bonds, who is forced to liquidate
before the termination of distribution, is enabled to do so at a much smaller
see, e.g., the loss of $32,755.00 sustained by Morgan, Stanley and Company on a Shell issue
in 1936, 10 TNEC VERBATni RncoRD (1939-40) 622.
64. For a proposed regulation eliminating, except under very stringent rules, sales to
"insiders," who are frequently in the best position to enjoy a "free ride," see Sec. Exch. Act
of 1934, SEC Release 3807 (1946). The regulation therein proposed has not as yet been pro-
mulgated, presumably because of widespread opposition to the proposal on the part of in-
vestment bankers.
65. Critics of the "artificiality" of present distribution methods frequently draw anal-
ogies to the merchandising of other commodities. Such analogies are open to attack, in
view of the many dissimilar factors involved, but it should be noted that few commodities
fluctuate as rapidly in price as do securities, and that many commodities subject to wide
fluctuation, e.g. agricultural products, are protected by government subsidies, price fixing,
and hedges through trading in futures, while state Fair Trade acts and the Miller-Tydings
amendment to the Sherman Act specifically authorize price maintenance agreements in the
merchandising of trade-marked products. Yet in spite of these "artificial" aids to distribu-
tion, which indicate the desire to avoid speculation in inventories common to all merchan-
disers, mark-ups which approached the spreads received by investment bankers would be
considered impossibly low in the distribution of other commodities.
66. "The pricing of new issues is completely dependent upon the price levels prevailing
upon the general securities market." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Requested by
Staff, 25, Matter of N.A.S.D., supra note 13.
67. ".... [F]inancing costs must be borne finally by the issuer or by the industry,
utility or government issuing the securities, and it must be passed on by the industry or
utility to the consumer, and by the government to the taxpayer. It is therefore extremely
important that the new issue be sold in a market which fairly represents as nearly as possible
the value of the thing sold." Hostetler, Descriptir Analysis in I.vsT!rE.-r BKmEns CODE
COMMITrEE, op. cit. supra note 19, at 68.
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discount, because of the stabilization activities of the underwriters, than
would otherwise be the case." Secondly, to the extent that the cost of capi-
tal to P.S.I. is reduced because of price maintenance, the value of the previ-
ous investor's interest in P.S.I. is increased. Referring to the two objectives
mentioned earlier, increased costs to the issuer-which may be expected
from elimination of price maintenance-outweigh any possible increase in
protection to the investor resulting from such elimination, unless some other
system of distribution can feasibly be substituted for the present one. 9
ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
In discussing possible alternatives, it will be well to consider tvo criticisms
of the present investment banking structure which are more general than
that as to artificiality of price. The first is that there is too great a concen-
tration of power in a few large New York investment houses and that such
concentration makes possible subtle and unhealthy banker domination of
issuers. 0 The second is that the present distribution system puts too much
emphasis on speed and aggressive salesmanship in placing an issue with the
investor.
71
68. In the P.S.I. issue, if the sale had been made within the first month of the offering,
the Manager would have bought the bond in at the issuing price; thereafter, the seller would
have taken a one point loss. The stabilization bid is sometimes intentionally placed some-
what below the offering price, so that investors who have merely changed their minds will
not be encouraged to sell before the termination of the distribution.
69. In the foregoing discussion it has been assumed arguendo that there is no middle
ground between elimination of all price maintenance provisions and retention of the present
system. The SEC Staff's brief suggests, however, that stabilization and repurchase penalty
provisions could be retained, and that only the agreements not to cut price should be elimi-
nated from the underwriting and sellinggroup agreements. This contention does not square
with the Staff's argument that price fixing is per se a violation of the antitrust laws, since
both stabilization and repurchase penalties are designed to support the public offering price.
Agreements to offer an issue at a fixed price, which included these two provisions, would
seem to amount in fact to agreements not to cut price. See Comm'r Healy, supra note 13,
at 74, "Why swallow a camel like stabilization of a market price and strain at a gnat like a
uniform offering price not to be broken during a period of primary distribution? The one
excuse for stabilizing, which everyone agrees is a form of manipulation of market prices, is
to protect a public offering price during a period of public distribution, in order to facilitate
that distribution. . . . Are the underwriters and distributors stabilizing against their own
price cutting?" Comm'r Healy also dissented from the SEC's statement of policy in re
regulation of stabilization. Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 2446 (1940).
70. See, generally, the investigations cited supra note 1. Douglas, in his DIrMOcRACIY
AND FINANCE, devotes one chapter to a discussion of the "centralization of industrial con-
trol," against which, he notes, a reaction has set in. DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 6
et seg. See also the same author's proposals for regional finance, id. at 18 el seg.
71. "The unhappy history of many security issues here has been considered as indica-
tion of a general lack of direction or deliberate misdirection of the flow of capital into invest-
ment and speculation. High pressure salesmen and inadequate or misleading information
disseminated through circulars, prospectuses and other advertising media have been espe-
cially criticized." TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., STOCK MARKET CONTROL (1934) 42.
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The first objection has been met, to some extent, by the requirement in
railroad and most utility issues of competitive bidding for the privilege of
underwriting the issue. 2 Other factors which have tended to reduce the
monopoly of a few large houses have been the availability of alternative
sources for capital funds, such as private placements and term bank loans,13
and a tendency on the part of certain houses to disregard the conventional
ethical taboos by actively soliciting underwriting from issuers who have long
done business exclusively with one of the large New York houses.7 4
Anxious though the SEC has been to break up "traditional" issuer-
underwriter relationships, 5 it has come to the defense of price maintenance,0
which indicates that the Commission has found no causal relation between
price maintenance and the concentration of power which it has sought to
reduce. However, any alternative to the present underwriting machinery
which might cut down that concentration should receive serious considera-
See also ArzNs, EDWARDS AND MOULT ON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 120-1. Section 12 of the
Securities Act of 1933, which prescribes liabilities of persons selling securities by means of
false or inadequate information, may be assumed to have dampened some of the ardor of the
high-pressure salesmen described above, but it is still true that securities distribution is es-
sentially a selling problem.
72. Competitive bidding has been required in Massachusetts public utility issues since
1870, and by the ICC on railroad equipment trusts since 1926. Western Maryland Equip-
ment Trust, 111 ICC 434 (1926). The SEC adopted rule U-50 requiring competitive bidding
for securities of public utility holding companies and their subsidiaries in 1941, and in 1944
the ICC required that all classes of railroad securities except stocks should be sold by com-
petitive bidding. In re Competitive Bidding in Sale of Securities, 257 ICC 129 (1944). See
Comment (1941) 50 YALEn L. J. 1071; (1943) 43 COL. L. REv. 89.
73. Private placement, which Will be discussed more fully infra, is the sale of securities
by the issuer to one or more large institutional investors. Term loans are made by commer-
cial banks, sometimes in conjunction with insurance companies, on a serial repayment basis.
ATK INs, EDWARDS AND Mour.Tox, op. cit. supra note 8, at 38-9. Financing of industry by
government agencies, such as the RFC, the Federal Reserve Banks and the Smaller War
Plants Corporation, was greatly expanded during the war, and may well continue to be im-
portant as an alternative to private capital financing. Id. at 11.
74. See, e.g., the break in the industry's united front against competitive bidding, when
three firms indicated that they favored such bidding. In re Competitive Bidding in Sale of
Securities, 257 ICC 129, 130 (1944).
75. ". . . [W]e have in the past been much concerned With the apparent existence of
monopoly abuses in the underwriting business resulting in lack of competition for the per-
formance of the underwriting function with respect to particular issuers. The existence of
ties between issuers and investment bankers whereby the same group of underwriters is
recognized to have a 'vested interest' in the financing of that issuer has long been recognized
as one of the abuses of our underwriting system." Supra note 13, at 43. For examples of
positive action by the SEC in this regard, see Matter of Blair & Co., 12 SEC 661 (1943);
Matter of The Dayton Power and Light Co., 8 SEC 950 (1941), aff'd Sub nom. Morgan
Stanley & Co. v. SEC, 126 F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
76. Supra note 13, at 22-3, 26-45; Statement of SEC on Regulation of "Pegging, Fixing
and Stabilizing" of Security Prices, Sec. Exch. Act, SEC Release No. 2446 (1940) 11, where,
in approving the continuation of stabilization activities under SEC regulation, the Commis-
sion found that "there are times when the 'free play' of the 'forces' of supply and demand
may, if unrestricted, produce socially or economically undesirable consequences."
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tion and, conversely, an alternative which gives promise of a further concen-
tration of power should be discarded.
Turning to the objection as to speed of distribution, it is interesting to
note that the present method bf distribution was evolved to meet the needs
of expanding industry at a time when capital funds for investment were
relatively scarce and distribution was often a long and difficult business.77
Investment bankers could not afford to tie up their limited capital resources
in one issue for a long period of time, but depended on aggressive sales or-
ganizations and price maintenance techniques to expedite distributions as
much as possible.78 During the past decade, however, the great majority of
issues have been distributed promptly, with little or no stabilization activ-
ity.7
9
Despite the relative ease with which distributions have been completed,
Congress in 1940 amended the Securities Act to confer upon the SEC dis-
cretion to accelerate the effective date of registration statements, where the
Commission finds that a reduction of the twenty-day waiting period is
desirable.0 Further, notwithstanding the infrequent use of stabilization in
recent issues, the Commission has, after careful consideration of the pros
and cons, allowed the practice to continue under close regulation.8'
A possible reason for the retention of what at first blush might appear to
be an outmoded mechanism is suggested by the authors of a recent publica-
tion by the Brookings Institute.82 They argue that increased demands for
77. Supra note 13, at 34; ATKINS, EDWARDS AND MOULTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 42.
78. "American underwriters . . . dare not [because of lack of capital] . . . take the
risk of being obliged to carry out their underwriting agreements by themselves investing
their own resources in the underwritten securities. They can afford to make such agreements
only on the supposition that they will, with great speed, be able to sell the securities to the
multitude of direct individual investors." Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 2446
(1940)4.
79. ATKINS, EDWARDS AND MOULTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 37-8; CIIERRINGTON,
THE INVESTOR AND THE SECURITIES ACT (1942) 206-7.
80. Section 8(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 as amended, 54 STAT. 857, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77h(a) (1940); Securities Act of 1933, SEC Release No. 2340 (1940). For a discussion of
the reasons for the waiting period as originally incorporated in the statute, see CHERRING-
TON, op. cit. supra note 79, at 62-4. Under the amendment, the period has been shortened
to from twelve to fourteen days, depending on the work-load of the Commission and the
type of information submitted; where the issue follows other recent issues of the same com-
pany, and it is only necessary to bring information submitted previously up to date, the
issue may become effective within six or seven days after registration.
81. The SEC, recognizing the difficulties inherent in "an adjustment between tile in-
terests of purchasing investors on the one hand and the needs of industry for capital funds
on the other," has embarked upon a policy of piecemeal regulation of stabilization, See.
Exch. Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 2446 (1940) 10, 13-14. The first step was the promulga-
tion of SEC Rule X-9 A 6-1, Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 2363 (1940), which
regulates in considerable detail the stabilization activities connected with the offering of a
registered security "at the market." For an extreme example of such activities in "at the
market" sales, see Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
82. ATKINS, EDWARDS AND MOULTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 41-2.
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capital can now be expected, while at the same time investment by wealthy
individuals has been curtailed by high tax rates. These factors should pro-
duce a tightening of the money market, with resulting long distributions,
more frequent use of stabilization, and a greater incentive to price cutting by
the individual dealer.8 3 In considering alternatives to our present invest-
ment banking industry, geared as it is for speedy and aggressive distribu-
tion, it will be important to examine how such alternatives are likely to
function in times of tight money.
Those who advocate change in our present investment banking practices
are wont to extoll the virtues of the English system, where a free market is
said to exist after an issue of securities is offered for sale.0 4 It is therefore
pertinent to examine wherein English practices differ from ours,8 and how
they might be adapted to the needs of our investors and industrialists.
The typical flotation of securities in England is the public prospectus
issue. A company in need of new capital contacts an "issuing house," and
arranges for the issuance of the desired type of securities. The issuing house
does not buy the securities but handles the advertising and the receipt of
subscriptions, and obtains the services of a group of underwriters who guar-
antee to take up whatever portion of the issue is not subscribed for by the
public.88 These underwriters include commercial banks, insurance com-
panies, investment trusts and private individuals who are prepared to pay
the subscription price and to retain the securities for investment?
83. Evidence of the tightening of the money market is already available. To the effect
that the "honeymoon" in the marketing of new issues is over, see: Hefferman in the N. Y.
Times, Sept. 8, 1946, § 3, p. 1, col. 8; the decline in A.T. & T. shares as a result of the com-
pany's announcement of a proposed $351,000,000 debenture issue, N. Y. Times, Aug. 24,
1946, p. 18, col. 5-7; d., Sept. 15, 1946, p. 13, col. 8.
84. TwENT Im CENTURY FUND, Ixc., THE SEcuRiTY MARKETS (1935) 79-S4; Steiner
and Lasdon, supra note 60, at 343-4; Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on
S. 3895, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) 16.
85. For a comparison which is unflattering to the American system, see T%,EET7_ II
CENTURY FUND, I.xc., ibid. But see Hanson, British Method of Securities Distribution (1933)
4 INvEsisasETr BANKING 148; Adkins, British System of Securities Distribution (1934) 4 IN-
VESTmENT BANmKNG 213. For a critical treatment of British practices, see FINmE, C.PITAL
UNDERWRITING (1934); Mayhew, Planned Investment (1939) NEw F,-.nrA,% RESEA\RCu PuB-
LIcATIONs No. 45. Kessler, The American Securities Act and Its Foreign Counterparts: A
Comparative Study (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1133, 1139, n. 22, provides a brief outline of conti-
nental distribution methods, which he finds to be closer to the American than to the British
system.
86. This technique, which is sometimes described as a "true" underwriting, finds its
American counterpart in cases where the issuing company offers additional securities directly
to its present investors, and an underwriter guarantees to purchase from the issuer any
securities not so sold.
87. Also included are stock jobbers and large brokerage houses, both of whom buy for
resale. However, under the segregation of functions which obtains in the English market,
jobbers cannot sell directly to investors, but must offer their holdings through brokers.
Similarly, brokers cannot be both principals and agents; if they buy securities for their own
account, they must sell to their customers through a jobber, who quotes the price at which
sale to the customer may be concluded. Hanson, loc. cit. supra note 85.
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On the issuing date, subscriptions are received from private investors and
brokers, the books remaining open for a short time, usually only two or three
days. Securities not sold to the public are then taken by the underwriters,"
who receive an overall commission plus a sum apportioned to the amount of
the issue they actually buy.89 After the public subscription closes, the se-
curity is listed on the London Exchange, usually being quoted at a premium
where the issue is oversubscribed, and at a discount if the underwriters take
up part of the issue.
Certain basic differences between American and English practice are at
once apparent. (1) There is nothing in the English system corresponding to
our selling group; (2) neither the issuing house nor the underwriters attempt
to stabilize the market;9 (3) underwriters generally buy for investment, not
for immediate resale. To these differences in technique should be added the
following differences in the securities market: (1) English issues are smaller
in number and size than those in the American market; (2) most British
investors, located in or having agents in London, can be reached through
newspaper advertising, and decide whether or not to purchase without solici-
tation from a dealer;9 ' (3) British investors generally buy for investment,
and are not as sensitive to fluctuations in the market price as are American
investors.
These differences indicate two primary objections to the adoption of the
English system here. Firstly, there is no assurance that a method of dis-
tribution suitable for relatively small issues, where most of the prospective
purchasers are geographically accessible, would be effective to maintain the
much larger flow of funds, from a widely scattered investing public, which
88. Methods of payment for securities vary considerably, but the typical practice is to
require that a down payment accompany the subscription, final payment being postponed
until the next semi-monthly Stock Exchange settlement date. During the interval between
the closing of the subscription books and the final settlement, underwriters who do not
desire to retain for investment, the securities which they are obligated to take up may sell
these securities through brokers and jobbers.
89. The issuing house receives an amount comparable to the American Manager's fee,
and brokers receive a discount on their subscriptions. The total spread is approximately the
same as it would be for comparable issues in this country, but the broker in England receivesi
a much smaller proportion of the spread than does the American dealer. Adkins, supra
note 85, at 214.
90. There are indications, however, that the British market is not completely free:
"Broker and jobber will try to get the shares held as widely as possible, to make the market
a free one. They must be prepared to see that undesirable fluctuations in the market both
before and after the issue are 'ironed out' as much as possible. Support is sometimes also
given to the market before the issue is made, especially in the case of mining issues. This
practice is frowned on by some high-grade issuing houses, but the Treasury itself usually
supports the gilt-edged market before the issuing of a government loan." Mayhew, s8pra
note 85, at 13.
91. However, it "should not be assumed that the English investor applies for any issue
automatically. The brokers more or less sell the issue to their clients. They keep careful tab
on his holdings and if the issue is suitable they will recommend him to put in ls applica-
tion." Hanson, supra note 85, at 150.
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has been customary in this country. Secondly, it is unlikely that the habits
of the American investor, who is accustomed to being "sold" on an issue,
and is acutely conscious of even slight shifts in market price, could easily be
changed to conform to the British system. It should also be noted that
English writers have condemned their system in no uncertain terms, em-
phasizing its lack of organization 9 2 and the tendency of issuing houses to
sponsor highly speculative issues.
93
The objection as to concentration of power in New York, mentioned
earlier, appears to apply with equal force to the English system which, if
adopted here, would tend to increase this concentration. Issuing houses,
desirous of close contacts with large investors and potential underwriters,
would locate in New York, and the potential power of issuing houses, banks
and insurance companies over issuers would be increased. 4
Another possible alternative to the present investment banking machinery
might be the development of firms with very large capital funds,"3 which
would individually buy securities from an issuer and distribute them gradu-
ally, either through selling branches or through independent dealers who
would purchase from the underwriting firm whenever there appeared to be
an opportunity for resale.
In such a scheme, price maintenance would be entirely discretionary with
the underwriter, who would presumably have sufficient capital to ride out
any temporary fluctuations in the market. However, the emphasis in issu-
ance of securities would be shifted from merchandising, which stresses rapid
turnover and maximum volume of sales, to speculative investment with the
possibility of large profits for the underwriter in a rising market and disas-
trous losses during a prolonged slump, which might dissipate the largest
capital resources. The freezing of capital, with the increased risks incident
upon holding for a long period, would tend to increase cost to the issuer,
92. ". . . [I]n all great industrial countries except England there is a recognized and
effective machinery for concentrating the savings of investors, and with those savings sup-
plying the capital needs of industry and trade. An integral part of this machinery is a proper
underwriting system. In this country alone is there no such machinery, and underwriting
is haphazard and unorganized." FiNNiE, op. cit. supra note 85, at 14.
93. "There are today very few good Home Issuing Houses, and very many bad ones.
. . . The consequence is that thoroughly unsound issues are frequently floated, and the
public is given no guidance, such as would be given by the sponsorship of a well-known and
reputable issuing house." Mayhew, supra note 85, at 12.
94. Extensive statutory changes would be required in order to permit banks and insur-
ance companies to participate in underwriting. Investment Trusts are permitted to partici-
pate in underwriting under existing laws.
95. Despite the emphasis placed upon decentralization and regional finance by a
former chairman (DouGLAs, op. cit. supra note 7 at 6 cl seg.), the SEC appears to favor the
development of firms with large financial resources, as a means of doing away with the
necessity for stabilization. "A closer approach to the ideal than is now achievable may in
the future be found in the development of investment banking or other underwriting insti-
tutions with sufficient resources so that the need for stabilizing can be substantially reduced,
even entirely eliminated." Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 2446 (1940) 3.
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and the opportunities for domination of the issuer would be increased since
the number of firms in the underwriting field would be reduced and there
would be a premium on size.
A final possible alternative might be the expansion of the present private
placement and "best effort" techniques. Private placement, now used ex-
tensively by large, well-established issuers, is the sale of new securities di-
rectly to large institutional investors, such as insurance companies, by-
passing the investment banker and, incidentally, the requirements of regis-
tration with the SEC.96 This technique is subject to the obvious limitation
that only securities having an investment rating sufficiently high to meet
the standards set up for insurance companies and trusts may be sold to such
institutions. It is also criticized because it circumvents a major purpose of
the Securities Acts by avoiding the necessity for full disclosure through regis-
tration, and deprives smaller institutions and individual investors of an
opportunity to purchase gilt-edged issues, making it difficult to obtain well-
balanced portfolios. Finally, it results in a very narrow holding of the se-
curity, with possible unhealthy consequences for the issuer."
The "best effort" operation is an agency relationship between issuer and
investment banker, under which the latter, for a commission, undertakes to
sell, either directly or through a selling group, as much of a new issue as
possible at an agreed selling price. 8 This technique has not been used ex-
tensively in new issues, perhaps because issuers are willing to pay invest-
ment bankers a larger spread for assuming whatever underwriting risk in-
heres in current financing methods.99
An expansion of the "best effort" technique would produce little change
in the existing distribution system, for both stabilization and fixed price
issuing would still be desirable from the issuer's point of view. The actual
mechanics of distribution would remain much the same, except that there
would be one less transfer of "title" in the process of issuance of new securi-
96. "The significance of this evasion factor is indicated by the fact that private place-
ment has developed mainly in those classes of securities which are subject to SEC control,"
ATKINS, EDWARDS AND MOULTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 110.
97. Id. at 111-3. Other objections which have been made are: (1) the issuer may be
forced to accept a price considerably lower than the actual value of the security, since there
are relatively few large institutional buyers, and it is quite conceivable that they might have
an "understanding" as to the price they will quote; (2) the traditional underwriting method
is still necessary for the flotation of securities not qualified for insurance company portfolios,
and loss of a substantial portion of the underwriters' business might result in the drying up
of the investment banking industry, or in the requirement of much larger spreads. See
Gourrich, supra note 57.
98. ATxINs, EDWARDS AND MOULTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 40.
99. Arguments have been made to the effect that investment bankers perform no true
risk-bearing function. Whatever validity might have been attributable to these contentions
during times of "easy 'money," the recent recession in the stock market, during which many
underwriters sustained sizeable losses, has given concrete proof of the continued existence
of the risk factor, which may become increasingly important if the present trend toward
tighter money markets continues. See note 83 supra.
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ties, and spreads might be lowered slightly to compensate for the complete
elimination of risk on the part of the underwriters. Price maintenance under
such a setup would be easy to enforce, as both the "underwriters" and deal-
ers would be acting as agents for the issuer.
REGULATION OF TE ExISTING DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Neither the elimination of price maintenance from the present distribu-
tion system nor the substitution of the British or some other alternative
system offers a practical and desirable solution to the dual problem of safe-
guarding the investor and assuring the continued flow of capital to industry.
It remains to inquire whether the present system, now regulated by the
SEC, should be subjected to additional regulation, and if so, by whom.
The SEC, which presently enjoys an enviable reputation among adminis-
trative agencies, has been active in the issuance of rules and interpretations
designed to protect the issuer and the investor.00 By requiring competitive
bidding and checking closely on underwriting spreads in issues governed by
the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the Commission has created a
yardstick which serves as a deterrent against any attempted exaction of
exorbitant underwriting fees in other issues.' The dangers of stabilization
have been fully and publicly discussed, and a program of regulation outlined
and initiated, 0 2 while at the same time the Commission has issued regula-
tions facilitating the use of the stabilization technique within its prescribed
sphere 103 and under the cold glare of "full disclosure."
100. For recent examples of the Commission's continuing vigilance, see Charles Hughes
& Co. v. SEC, 139 F. (2d) 434 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 786 (1944) (exces-
sive mark-ups on over-the-counter sales); Matter of Ira Haupt & Co., Sec. Exch. Act of
1934, SEC Release No. 3845 (1946) (public distribution of large block of stock held to be
"underwriting," not exempt from registration); Matter of Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., Sec.
Exch. Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 3791 (1946) (sales of new issue during waiting period).
101. Competitive bidding, long a subject of disagreement bet,een the SEC and a major-
ity of investment banking houses, is again under fire, in view of the recent failure of tvo
proposed competitive offerings. N. Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1946, p. 13, col. 8. The charge is
made that it is only a "fair weather" mechanism, ineffective in the presence of a declining
market. See statement of Col. Pope, supra note 37, at 463. The SEC has recently permitted
negotiated financing under the Holding Company Act because of "circumstances peculiar
to the instant case," the Commission finding that "the negotiation process may afford a
desirable degree of flexibility." Matter of Columbia G. & E. Corp., Cincinnati G. & E. Co.,
Holding Company Act of 1935, SEC Release No. 6840 (1946) 8, 9.
It seems doubtful that the Commission will seek legislation requiring competitive
bidding on all types of securities, for the Commission admits that "it has not always been
effective, especially where there is limited response to a particular offering." Matter of
N.A.S.D., supra note 13, at 45.
102. Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, Release No. 2363 (1940). For an example of the close check
maintained on stabilization by the SEC, see Matter of Kidder Peabody & Co., Sec. E.-ch.
Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 3673 (1945) (undisclosed stabilization resulting in raising
price of outstanding securities before secondary offering).
103. SEC Rule X-16 C-2, Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 3801 (1946), liber-
alizes the Commission's rules as to short sales in stabilization operations.
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The foregoing is evidence that the SEC has not retrogressed to that stage
of moribundity which has caused cynics to suggest that every administrative
agency should be abolished after ten years' service. The Commission, as the
agency to which Congress specifically delegated authority to regulate the
investment banking industry, can be expected to recommend to Congress
any statutory changes found to be desirable, and meanwhile has ample lati-
tude under existing legislation to prevent abuses of the machinery of price
maintenance.
The difficulties inherent in the enforcement of antitrust decrees, together
with the lengthy litigation required in each individual suit where a variety
of factors such as those suggested by the SEC"°4 must be considered, mili-
tate against the use of the Antitrust Division and the courts in the regulation
of securities distributions. 105 The present distribution system can better be
controlled on a continuing basis by a single agency charged with that duty
by Congress, namely, the SEC.
o CONCLUSION
It is probable that any action brought as a result of the Antitrust Divi-
sion's present investigation of the investment banking industry will be
directed against abuses of the underwriter-issuer relationship, long the
favorite target for investigators in this field.' The foregoing discussion has
demonstrated that such abuses are not linked with the price maintenance
104. See note 42 supra.
105. A possible escape from the conflict that would occur between tile SEC and a court
enforcing an antitrust decree drafted by the Antitrust Division would be the appointment
of the SEC as a special master to enforce the decree. Although no statutory authority or
judicial precedent for such an appointment exists, such a development would be no more
revolutionary than the decree entered in the case of Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,
323 U. S. 386 (1945), discussed in Comment, 56 YALE L. J. 77.
106. "The investigation has taken several turns in the five years it has been under
way .... In recent months, however, the emphasis was placed on formation of buying
syndicates, the implication being that group's formed to negotiate or bid for deals were corn.
binations in restraint of trade." N. Y. Journal American, Oct. 24, 1946, p. 22, col. 2. A hint
that the SEC might welcome the assistance of the Antitrust Division in this particular
field is found in the N.A.S.D. opinion, where, after emphasizing the existence of ties between
issuers and bankers, the Commission describes its attempt to meet the problem "in so far
as our limited powers permit" by requiring competitive bidding for utilities securities,
and continues ". . . we do not regard our rule as the definitive answer to attempts to
restrain competition." Matter of N.A.S.D., supra note 13, at 44. Another likely target
which the Commission might prefer to leave to the mercies of the Antitrust Division Is
found in the possibilities of undue influence in the relations between large underarliters and
selling group members. The SEC hinted that here too the antitrust laws should apply.
"The natural effect of the strength of the manager cannot, perhaps, be changed by mere
regulation. But to the extent that a large house might apply its strength by taking action-
e.g., by boycotting those who refuse to accept undesirable participations, it would be tamper-
ing with the normal competitive forces of the market." Matter of N.A.S.D,, suipra note 13,
at45, n. 57.
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features of the distribution system, for price maintenance is as important in
issues sold to the-underwriters through competitive bidding as those sold
through negotiation.
Any proposal for change in the present method of securities distribution
will require careful consideration by Congress. It is at least doubtful whether
the removal of price maintenance techniques from our present system, or the
substitution of an alternative method, will insure a continuing flow of capital
from investor to industry during the post-war years. The introduction of
any change will be even more hazardous if, as now seems likely, the post-war
period combines continuing demand for new capital with a shrinkage in the
funds available for investment.
